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This research was undertaken to evaluate the effective-
ness of the Navy Office of Legislative Affairs procurement
workshops in strengthening the defense industrial base and
increasing competition.
The researcher found, through a literature review, that
there is a need for the procurement workshops. The defense
industrial base has shrunk over the last few decades to
where there is concern over whether or not the U.S. would be
able to fight a prolonged war. Additionally, competition
has become the watchword in Navy procurement.
Through the use of a questionnaire to survey attendees
at workshops over the last three years, starting with 1984,
the researcher determined that the workshops have been ef-
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. INTRODUCTION
Present policy of the Department of Defense along with
U.S. National Security objectives have as their core the
deterrence of military conflict with other nations. If the
U. S. cannot deter war, then the U.S. must be prepared to
bring all of its resources to bear in order to win any
engagement with the enemy and preserve our way of life and
national heritage. [Ref. l:pg. 28]
The industrial base of the United States is in danger of
deteriorating to the point where, we would be unable to
perform surge or rapidly mobilize. [Ref. 2:pg. 10] This is
the viewpoint of numerous government and private individuals
and should be of great interest and concern to military
personnel regardless of their service connections or
military occupational specialty. This is, or should be, of
particular interest to the contracting officer. Through
various directives, he is charged with the planning
necessary to prevent this deterioration. One organization
attempting to retard this erosion of the industrial base and
also to increase competition is the Naval Office of Legisla-
tive Affairs. With the assistance of The Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics), they
have put together a program that: consists of meetings with
business people. These meetings are an attempt to show
these businessmen how to do business with the Government in
general and the Navy in particular.
B. BACKGROUND
According to LCDR Robert Law, Contracts Liaison Officer
of the Naval Office of Legislative Affairs, the present
procurement workshops are conducted in response to, in
conjunction with, and for members of the House of
Representatives in their local congressional districts. The
work of setting up the meeting area and other details is
left primarily to the Congressman's staff. The Navy is
responsible for providing briefing personnel on the date and
at the location decided upon. The objectives of the
procurement workshops are twofold, according to LCDR Law:
1
.
To attempt to increase the defense industrial base
(DIB) by increasing participation by small business,
2. To increase small business competition in the
Department of the Navy.
Achievement of these goals benefits the Navy in two ways.
By increasing the number of businesses competing for the
Navy's business, the Navy should be able to lower the price
of the goods and services that it obtains, and by increasing
competition the Navy should be increasing the number of
businesses doing work for the Government thereby increasing
the defense industrial base.
C. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this paper is to examine the DIB and
competition in the Navy in relationship to the procurement
workshops, in an effort to determine if the workshops have
been effective in strengthening the DIB and increasing com-
petition .
D. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary question for this research was, "What have
been the results of the procurement workshops and what did
the attendees think about their usefulness to them in help-
ing them to obtain Government contracts?".
In addition to the primary research question, the
following subsidiary questions were formulated:
1. What has been effect of the procurement workshops in
increasing the number of small businesses that
contract to provide for Navy needs?
2. What type of business sends representatives to the
workshops, manufacturing or service?
3. Have these workshops increased the competitive base?
4. Have these workshops strengthened the DIB?
5. Will the business people, who had no prior experience
in Government contracting, attempt to contract with
the Government after having attended a workshop.
6. Why did the attendees come to the workshops?
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS.
The scope of the paper will be concentrated primarily on
the workshops themselves with an introductory chapter on the
DIB and competition in the Navy in the 1980's. The limita-
tions that the researcher encountered had to do with not
being able to meet with people in Government and private
business face to face to the extent preferred. Telephonic
interviews are less productive than personal interviews.
Also the researcher was limited' by the numbers and quality
of answers that were received from the questionnaire. It is
assumed that competition is wanted and desirable, even
though there are those who argue that competition, or at
least unchecked foreign competition, is a hindrance to
maintaining the DIB. [Ref. 3]
F. METHODOLOGY
The methodology was threefold: First, the literature
was reviewed to determine the perceived problems with the
DIB and competition. Second, the questionnaire was written
to gather information on how the attendees felt about the
workshop. Last, interviews were held, both in person and
telephonically
, to clarify information obtained.
G. MAJOR FINDINGS
1. The defense industrial base appears to be shrinking
2. The Navy is having problems in preparing a Production
Base analysis as required by DOD.
3. The Navy had been trying to increase competition in
its procurement actions even before the passage of the
1984 Competition in Contracting Act (CICA).
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4. A large number of the respondents to the questionnaire
had not done business with the DOD prior to their
attendance at the procurement workshops.
5. The number of respondents, who stated they did not
know how to sell to the Government decreased after
their attendance at a workshop.
6. The procurement workshops appear to have been effec-
tive in getting businesses to attempt to bid on
Government contracts.
H. ORGANIZATION AND STUDY
The next two chapters will be discussions on the DIB and
competition respectively. These chapters will attempt to
give the reader some background information dealing with
those subjects, their problems and issues. Chapter Four
will be a discussion of the workshops with a short narrative
on the conduct of the workshop that the researcher attended
in Daytona Beach, Florida in August of 1986. The reasons
the Navy had for beginning the program will be stated there
as seen by the founder of the workshops for the Navy, Rear
Admiral Joseph Sansone (Ret.), and the information passed
out to the participants will be highlighted. Chapter Five
will deal with the questionnaires' formulation and Chapter
Six will analyze the questionnaires that were returned. The
last chapter will contain the researcher's conclusions,
recommendations and will answer the research questions.
11
II. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
A. INTRODUCTION
There are those who will argue that there is not a
problem with America's industrial base. They will use the
argument that the United States is still a world leader in
manufacturing. Their argument is that the manufacturing
industries face problems but that the United States is not
"deindustr ializing" . They will give as proof of their argu-
ment data which show that the "output, employment and cap-
ital stock of U.S. manufacturing grew from 1950 through
1980." [Ref. A:pg. 88] These same people will then tell you
that it is true that the makeup of the U.S. manufacturing
sector has, over the last twenty years, changed and that
instead of having the type of industry that is resource-
intensive, the U.S. manufacturing sector is now high-tech-
nology oriented. Their claim is that this shift and the
change in makeup is no danger to our position in the world
markets. [Ref. 4:pg. 89] These are the views of economists
and it is true that the methodology that they use to measure
the industrial base leads them to these conclusions. How-
ever, if one considers that there are industries that are
vital to this nation's survival, then economic theories
which disregard these industries are not proper. This is




wherein he addresses the same problem of
dogmatic economic theory being used when other issues should
be of greater importance. [Ref. 3:pg. 11]
The popular conception of what constitutes the DIB is
that of the large defense contractors like Lockheed and
General Dynamics. This is a misconception shared by much of
the public [Ref. 5:pg. 28]. In the briefing that the re-
searcher attended at the procurement workshop in Daytona
Beach, Florida the Navy pointed out in their presentation
the top ten Navy Prime Contractors for 1985. Of these the
aerospace companies held the first four positions and domin-
ated the total (see Figure 1). However it became apparent
that the large prime contractors were not the entire base
and were not the part of the base that was in danger of
being unable to surge or mobilize. [Ref. 6:pg. 11] Hidden
behind the major aerospace firms and other prime contractors
for the Department of Defense (DoD) is a vast array of
subcontractors and lower tier suppliers, spread over many
industries [Ref. 5:pg. 33]. These are the businesses that,
according to the literature, would have the most difficulty
in surge/mobilization if the need arose. [Ref. 7:pg. v] The
defense industrial base then is comprised of the businesses
that produce the hardware necessary for this country to
ensure its continued ability to defend itself. The busi-
nesses that produce the hardware necessary for this country
13























Figure 1 Top Ten Navy Contractors FY 1985
provided by Asst. SECNAV (Shipbuilding and Logistics)
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to ensure its continued ability to defend itself. The
businesses in question are from both the large and small
spectrum of the total industrial base [Ref. 8:pg. 1]. It is
difficult to determine the size of the base because of its
constantly shifting nature [Ref. 7:pg. 1] and because of the
lack of a complete data base on the subcontractors and lower
tier suppliers [Ref. 5:pg. 34]. In fact the Navy office
that is in charge of Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP)
stated that at the present time they are unsure as to
exactly who comprises the data base that would enable them
to do the requisite planning. [Ref. 9]
The purpose of this section of the paper is to provide
the reader some background information on what the DIB is
and the major issues and problems that are and have been
discussed in the literature that was reviewed. This section
is not intended to be all inclusive of the issues that are
currently being discussed. It is not intended to be a
vehicle that offers suggestions or recommendation on the
issues and problems. It is to be used to set the background
for one of the objectives of the OLA,
B. HISTORY OF U.S. MOBILIZATION
"It is one of the follies of human nature that the
lessons of history are repeatedly ignored, and this tendency
is especially true in our free society." [Ref. 3:pg. 2]
This was a statement made by Mr. G. T. Nickolas in a paper
15
entitled The Industrial Base Under Siege
,
in which he claims
that the problems that we faced in getting our war efforts
under way in World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam were
forgotten almost immediately after each of these conflicts.
This claim is prevalent in the literature. American defense
policy has not been one which has supported maintaining the
defense industrial base. It was not until World War II that
a full scale industry devoted principally to the defense of
the nation was established. During the nineteenth century
and up until the start of the Second World War the manufac-
ture of guns and ships for the defense of the country was a
shared venture between the Government, through their arse-
nals, and private enterprise. This was characterized by the
procurement of arms being an episodic affair. At the begin-
ning of war we were usually found to be unprepared with the
manufacture of civilian goods dominating the U.S. manufac-
turing base. [Ref. 5:pg. 22]
1. World War I.
Adequate preparation for war has never yet in history been
made after the beginning of hostilities without unneces-
sary slaughter, unjustifiable expense and national peril.
It is only in the years of peace that a nation can be made
ready to Fight. [Ref. 6:pg. 7]
Unfortunately we as a nation had not taken this into con-
sideration as war raged in Europe. And in fact "during
World War I the United States sent two million men to
Europe, but they had to fight mostly with French and British
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made weapons" [Ref. 5:pg. 21]. The Ichord report (a 1980
Congressional committee study) stated that the major contri-
butor to this deficiency was the lead times associated with
getting the material produced in the U.S. [Ref. 6:pg. 7] If
the war had continued for a longer period of time the abi-
lity of the U.S. to produce the equipment needed would have
caught up and become more important. [Ref. 5:pg. 21] In
fact it is the view of some that the German General Staff
was convinced of the futility of the further prosecution of
the war because of the capability of the U.S. base to pro-
vide the means to fight once the U.S. was able to get the
process started. [Ref. 10:pg. 22] The reason for the long
lead times was due in part to a "complete absence of plans
prior to our entry into World War I, with a glaring short-
coming being the lack of defined requirements about what was
needed and when." [Ref. ll:pg. 6] After the wars end the
majority of the businesses that had gone from civilian to
defense products either converted back to civilian goods or
went out of business. [Ref. 5:pg. 21]
2. 1920 to the Second World War
In 1920 the Congress passed legislation that was
supposed to prevent the pre World War I condition from
recurring. The legislation was called the National Defense
Act of 1920. It led to the establishment of an organization
that was to perform industrial planning under the direction
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of the Secretary of War [Ref. 6:pg. 7]. The mission of the
organization was to provide for the mobilization of the
country in the event of a national emergency. The organiza-
tion produced a series of plans every three years from 1930
through 1939 called the Industrial Mobilization Plans (IMP).
[Ref. ll:pg. 6] The effectiveness of the plan is in dis-
pute. The Ichord panel stated they were very important in
the beginning of World War II in assisting the U.S. in
building up its industrial base to meet the needs generated
by the war. [Ref. 6:pg. 7] Others thought that a "safe
judgment of the value of the IMP process may be that it
caused a great deal of productive thinking that shortened
the mobilization process after the war started." [Ref.
11:P8. 6]
3. World War II .
"It took the United States of America nearly 4 years
to gear up to the war production levels necessary to win
World War II." [Ref. 3:pg. 2] What had happened to the
planning that was being conducted? Though the planners were
planning, the base had been allowed to deteriorate and the
facilities built for the production of war materials for
World War I had been scrapped. [Ref. 12:pg. 2] By 1939,
even though the Congress had given attention to the problem
identified during World War I, the industrial base had
deteriorated. [Ref. 6:pg. 8] By 1941 the production base
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was increasing but had not as yet attained the necessary-
rate required [Ref. 10:pg. 8]. This is not to say that a
quantity of material was not produced between the time the
U.S. entered the war and two years later. During this time
the U.S. was able to produce in excess of 67,000 aircraft,
almost 29,000 tanks and about 180 combatant ships.
Furthermore during the conduct of the war the U.S.
produced a total of 310,000 aircraft, 88,000 tanks, 10
battleships, 358 destroyers, 211 submarines, 27 aircraft
carriers, 411,000 artillery tubes and howitzers, 12,500,000
rifles and carbines and almost 900,000 trucks and motor
driven weapons carriers. [Ref. 6:pg. 8] The question during
this period of time, was not did the U.S. have the capacity
to produce the needed items, but rather why did we allow the
base to deteriorate? The reason, in the researcher's
opinion, is that America is not willing to supersede the
consumer demand for the resources needed to maintain a base
which would be ready to mobilize at a moments notice. The
Ichord report states "the conclusion of World War II saw the
American industrial base undergo a rapid change from pro-
ducing military hardware to producing consumer goods." [Ref.
6:pg. 8]
4 . After WW II and Prior to Korea .
The period between 1945 and 1950 saw a great deal of
investment in new plants and equipment. A total of 115
19
billion dollars was spent to increase the U.S. production
capacity which increased the overall production capacity by
40 per cent. Much of this increase, though, was for produc-
tion of consumer goods. [Ref . 6:pg. 8] Another aspect of
the conversion back to civilian goods was that in the rush
to do this the Government divested itself of many Government-
owned facilities and those that were not disposed of were
not funded for maintenance and were allowed to deteriorate.
During this period, thirty-four machine tool companies
closed because of a lack of Government interest and
policies. This resulted in our having, by 1951, only about
one third of the machine tool capacity that we had at the
start of World War II. [Ref. ll:pg. 8]
5 . Korean War .
With the Korean conflict coloring Congressional
thought during 1950, the need for more legislation was
thought to be necessary in order to better allocate indus-
trial resources. With this thinking the Congress passed, in
1950, The Defense Production Act which was used to:
. . . establish a system of priorities and allocations for
materials and facilities, authorize the requisitioning
thereof, provide financial assistance for expansion of
productive capacity and supply, provide for price and wage
stabilization, provide for the settlement of labor dis-
putes, strengthen controls over credit, and by these
measures facilitate the production of goods and services
necessary for the national security, and for other
purposes. [Ref. 6:pg. 8]
20
More specifically this Act established what was then known
as the Defense Priorities System (DPS) (now referred to as
the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS). DPS was
used to ensure that programs which were vital for national
security would receive the resources necessary for accom-
plishment. What it did specifically was to provide priority
purchase of products for contractors and subcontractors.
These products were considered to be materials which would
be assigned to the contractor who required them before any
other manufacturer. [Ref. 13:pgs. 2-26] This was to be done
with the least possible amount of interruption to the rest
of the economy. [Re. ll:pg. 15]
During the first part of the Korean War, the Govern-
ment attempted several actions designed to aid the industrial
base. One of the major problems mentioned was the lack of
machine tools which the Government had exacerbated by its
sale of such tools immediately following the Second World
War .
Because machine tools are essential to any industrial
expansion, the machine tool industry received assistance
. . . with minor exception, shipment of tools to users
outside the defense industry was banned. [Ref. ll:pg. 28]
Additionally, the Government encouraged the industry by
other programs. These programs included the Korean Pool
Order Program which ordered 87,000 general purpose tools,
the Toolbuilder ' s Facilities Expansion Program, which bought
and leased to toolbuilders another 2,375 tools in order for
21
them to build other tools, the Elephant Tool Program where
the Government financed the manufacture of tools that were
large, had long lead times and were needed to produce other
large machine tools, and the M-Day Pool Order Program which
guaranteed purchase of tools by the Government. [Ref. ll:pg.
29]
6 . Vietnam
After 1956, the United States began to dismantle the
industrial base that had been built up during the Korean War
because it was not possible to justify the expenditure
necessary to support it. The Navy rid itself of 80 percent
of the plant and equipment that it had sustained during and
immediately after the conflict. [Ref. ll:pg. 51] This was
not of great impact on the war in Vietnam though as the
United States did not mobilize, instead we surged to meet
our needs. Even in this we did not truly surge in that we
stepped up production rapidly but rather we set the pace in
Vietnam to allow the capacity available in the base to build
up gradually. [Ref. 6:pg. 9]
The period after the Vietnam War brought into
question very sharply the issue of the ability of the United
States to mobilize if a national emergency arose. In 1976,
a report by the Defense Science Board Task force found that
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. . .the United States is presently deficient in the
extent to which the defense industrial base is postured to
provide material support to the forces in being in
response to the full spectrum of potential conflict
situations upon which our national security plans are
based . [Ref . 6
: pg . 9
]
We are again at that point where we have historically found
ourselves at the conclusion of our involvement in a con-
flict. Once again we would have to hope that the enemy who
attacked us would allow us the time to mobilize as the
Germans and Japanese did in World War II.
C. PROBLEMS/ISSUES
The Defense Industrial Base is made up of those business
firms and Government facilities which produce the weapons
and the services that are utilized by the Department of
Defense. [Ref. 8:pg. 1] Measuring this base is difficult
and, in fact, the Navy does not currently have a firm deter-
mination of who makes up the base which they would draw upon
in the event of an emergency. [Ref. 14] The literature
indicates that there are "approximately 25,000 prime con-
tractors and more numerous subcontractors" [Ref. 15:pg. 25],
another source gives the same figure for the prime contrac-
tors and defines the number of subcontractors more defini-
tively by stating that there are "about 50,000 firms in the
lower tiers." [Ref. 8:pg. 1] The latest figures available
put the number of prime contractors at 60,000 and the lower
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tier subcontractors and vendors in the hundreds of thou-
sands. [Ref. 16:pg. 75] Though the literature uses these
numbers, the researcher was unable to locate anyone that
could ascertain how the figures are generated. The problem
of measurement is caused by the entry and exit of firms who
are part of the base. Additionally, a contractor for one
contract can be a subcontractor on a another contract. [Ref.
7:pg. ii] This lower tier network from the second level
tier and lower is one of the major problems among several
that are recognized. It is felt that it is eroding for
several reasons which will be discussed further in this
section of the chapter.
--
' 1 . The Ichord Report .
"As much as any single factor the industrial
capacity of a country determines its ultimate success on the
battlefield." [Ref. 17:pg. 2] Unfortunately, the ability of
our supplier network that is the prime ingredient making up
the defense industrial base is in danger of becoming too
small to be effective. [Ref. 18:pg. 35] This was the major
finding of a report prepared by the Defense Industrial Base
Panel chaired by Representative Richard H. Ichord in 1980.
Additional findings of the panel were:
a. The problem with the supplier network is not at the
prime contractor level where there exists excess
capacity. The deficiencies exist at the subcontractor
1 and lower levels.
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b. If there were a national emergency the industrial base
would be unable to surge its production to meet the
threat
.
c. The lead times required to obtain the equipment
delineated by the military services have increased
within the last several years.
d. The manpower pool for those billets that require
skilled people is shrinking and will continue to do so
throughout the decade of the 80's.
e. The Nation has become dependent upon foreign suppliers
for both raw materials and specialized military
components
.
f. The manufacturing base of the United States is
currently the lowest of the free world industrialized
nations in terras of productivity growth rate,
g. Capital investment necessary for upgrading technology,
plant and property has been curtailed because of
inflation, tax policies that were unfavorable and the
priorities of management. [Ref. 6:pg. 11]
Mr. Dale Church, then Deputy Under Secretary for Defense
Acquisition Policy, "characterized the defense industrial
base as unbalanced" Ref. ll:pg. 12] and said "while
sufficient capacity generally exists at the prime contractor
level to support defense programs, deficiencies exist at the
subcontractor and vendor levels." [Ref. 19:pg. 3] A Defense
Science Board Task Force found the base was shrinking.
According to the task force "there was a reduction of 1500
suppliers from the 6000 that had participated in ... a
. . . program during the previous year." Further the task
force noted that for another program the bids received had
declined by 40 percent from one year to the next. [Ref.
6:pg. 12] There have been several reasons cited for this
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stated decline. Among these was the instability of defense
programs, especially for the lower tier contractors who are
usually harder hit than the larger primes by the fluctuation
/ in the program. [Ref. ll:pg. 70] Another complaint has been
voiced by a trade association, that represented manufac-
turers of materials handling equipment, about the Defense
Department's stringent application of material specifica-
tions that were well beyond the existing commercial stan-
l
dards and practices. [Ref. 20:pg. 20] Other problems cited
were "excessive administrative requirements, sporadic pro-
curement practices and restrictive documentation, plus a
lack of flow down benefits from the prime contractors."
[Ref. ll:pg. 70] The subcontractors testified that they
also suffered more from the paperwork that was associated
with defense work than the larger firms. In fact, the sub-
contractors stated that they would rather stay with and
perform commercial work than do defense work. [Ref. 6:pg.
13-14] A partial list of paperwork that a small firm was
required to comply with in order to do business with the
Government during this time period follows:
* DoD 250 special shipping documents on small dollar
orders ;
* changes in accounting systems to satisfy the cost
Accounting Standards Act (P. L. 91-379);




*records reflecting compliance with various
socieconomic programs such as Equal Opportunity,
Walsh-Healy, Small Business, and Labor Surplus
Utilization ;
records reflecting compliance with inspection and
testing requirements, such as MIL-I-45208;
technical manuals and provisioning requirements beyond
normal commercial manual;
a multitude of boiler plate provisions which require
the advice of a lawyer. [Ref. 21:pg. 146-147]
It is small wonder that small firms had been found to be
leaving the arena of defense business when one considers the
amount of paperwork that was required. To make it even more
difficult the Ichord committee noted that in one instance a
small business stated that the primes added more paperwork
by adding administrative burdens of their own. [Ref. 6:pg.
14] This situation has not changed according to the Wall
Street Journal. A June 12, 1986 article noted that because
of recent budget cuts, Northrup was sending teams of its
buyers and analysts out to its suppliers to audit their
books. [Ref. 22:pg. 6]
2 . Industrial Preparedness Planning .
Another finding of the committee was that planning
by the Department of Defense for industrial preparedness was
nonexistent. This, coupled with other factors such as
inadequate budgeting and weapon system procurement stretch
out, had jeopardized the national security. The panel had
specifically found that the planning tool (DD Form 1519)
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that DOD used in measuring the potential of the industrial
base to surge or mobilize was lacking in realism. [Ref
.
6:pg. 18] Mr. Ichord summarized the panels concerns when he
stated :
. . . one of the things that troubles me most about the
situation is the apparent lack of a long range strategic
plan for industrial preparedness at the Department of
Defense. We have received testimony that clearly
indicates that the Consolidated Guidance--the planning
document used by the Department of Defense to establish
its force s tructure--does not even address industrial
preparedness. [Ref. 6:pg. 21]
What exactly was wrong with DOD planning? Was the
lack of planning due to an inadequate tool? Vawter in
claims that there was no truth in the statement that there
was no industrial preparedness planning but that instead
there was only inadequate planning with the use of the DD
1519. His claim was that the following problems exacerbated
the difficulty and caused the DD 1519 to be ineffective:
a. Requirements . The requirements levied upon industry
were unclear and fluctuated so much from year to year
that they were not credible to industry. Until the
Services developed requirements that were realistic and
were based on total mobilization that we would have no
credible base with which to deal with industry.
b. Staffing . Not enough people were assigned to the
agencies and departments responsible to perform the
preparedness planning.
c. Inconsistent DOD Policy . DOD had different policies
that were dichotomous to one another and that we were
not planning in a mobilization context.
d. Supplemental Planning . If the DD 1519 was used as it
had been intended, further planning would not be
necessary. [Ref. l:pgs. 91-95]
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The DD 1519 seems to be the primary means by which
the DOD plans with industry for surge and mobilization. [Ref
23:pg. 4] There are three other methods that are cited:
(1) use of a Data Item Description (DID),
(2) a direct industrial base planning method (DIBP), and
(3) special studies. [Ref. 24:pgs. 5-1]
One author called the DD 1519 the "heart of the existing
industrial preparedness planning system". [Ref. 25:pg. 27]
General Accounting Office (GAO) found in a 1985 study that
"it has become clear that the DD 1519 apparatus is
inadequate." [Ref. 7:pg. ii] The study noted that "the
further down the tiers of procurement a subcontractor is,
the less likely that DOD will have requested that informa-
tion the form is intended to provide." [Ref. 7:pg. 10]
3 . Solutions .
Recommendations have been made and accepted that may
help increase the base. Methods such as multi-year procure-
ment (MYP) will allow some stability at least at the prime
contractor level in the planning needed to upgrade their
capabilities. It was noted, however, that the major primes
are not the real problem and the only way that MYP will help
is if the primes pass to their subcontractors this same
stability
.
Other programs that have been recommended are the
Industrial Modernization Incentive Program (IMIP), the
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ManTech program and the Production Base Analysis (PBA). The
PBA is performed annually and describes the condition of the
existing defense industrial base and the results of indus-
trial preparedness planning. [Ref. 24:pgs. 9-1] The GAO
noted in a report on industrial preparedness planning to
Senator Nunn in 1985 that this analysis was to begin in
February of 1986 and that the Air Force and Army should have
no problem meeting this deadline. The Navy had not, at the
time of the 1985 report, produced an analysis because it did
not have a data base from which to begin. [Ref. 8:pgs. 8-9]
According to personnel in the office (Logistics Plans
Branch) responsible for planning and analysis, this situa-
tion had not changed and the first analysis had not yet
performed. [Ref. 9] Of course none of these programs will
have that much effect at the levels that are in trouble, if
the lower level suppliers either do not exist or are not
inclined to do business with the Government because they do
not know how to begin. This is one area that the Navy
procurement workshops can possibly be of benefit.
4 . Summary .
The industrial base has problems, most of which are
found at the lower tiers of the base. This is not a new
problem and has been discussed for several years, with many
people making recommendations to try to correct the situa-
tion. The U.S. problem today is caused by a reluctance to
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dedicate the material and resources necessary to ensure
proper mobilization and surge capability. This may not be
feasible because of the cost involved. We as a nation are
trying to correct the problem but the efforts being made may
not be adequate. Even if we do make the effort and expend
the necessary resources the process of rebuilding will take




The purpose of this section of the research effort is to
acquaint the reader with the subject of competition and what
the Navy has been doing with competition in the 1980's. The
material is not presented as an exhaustive treatise on the
subject but rather to give the reader an understanding of why
the Navy feels that the workshops being conducted to
increase the competitive base are important.
B. COMPETITION
In the private business world there are two very impor-
tant economic objectives, survival and profit. In order for
either of these objectives to be reached it is important for
the purchasing agent to get the best price for the materials
he purchases. Normally the best price is one which is fair
and reasonable. The question then becomes what is fair and
reasonable and how does one determine the price received is
such. [Ref. 26:pg. 149] Competition is a method by which a
fair and reasonable price can be determined.
One of the methods used in private industry to obtain
the right price is competitive bidding. Private buyers
usually restrict the number of bidders to eight [Ref. 26:pg.
156], whereas the Government requires full and open
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competition. The use of competitive bidding is dictated,
according to Dobler, Lee and Burt, by five criteria, which
are
:
1. The value of the purchase in dollar terms is of enough
expenditure to allow the seller and buyer to justify
the expense of using the bidding process.
2. The specifications are known to both parties and are
relatively clear. The seller also has to be able to
accurately estimate the cost of producing the item.
3. One of the types of competition where the number of
sellers is limited does not exist.
4. The sellers want the business and are qualified to
produce the product or service needed. (According to
Dobler, Lee and Burt this is the criterion that is
least often met.)
5. There is enough time to perform the process. [Ref.
26:pg. 157]
Dobler, Lee and Burt point out that whereas adequate
competition is the best method of obtaining the right price,
competitive bidding will not ensure adequate competition
unless all of the criteria listed above are present. In the
Government arena price competition is not the best way of
obtaining goods and services in many of the same instances
that Dobler, Lee and Burt cite for private business. In
addition to the criteria that are cited above, it has been
stated that price competition cannot be expected when the
Government is trying to buy research and development effort,
because the proposals will not exhibit the same characteris-
tics that would allow price comparisons. In this type of
effort the second type of competition can be utilized; that
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of design/technical competition which is prevalent in weapon
systems development. [Ref. 27:pg. 97]
The attitude of the Government has changed in recent
history from one of competing only when absolutely required
(in the researcher's opinion) to one of competing every
single transaction that is processed by the contracting
officer. This is not entirely the case but appearances
could convince the less informed that it is. A perusal of
the recent literature in the trade magazines and the news-
papers causes one to think this, especially if one reads the
comments of the officials in DOD and Congress regarding the
subject. Competition, though, is a requirement and has been
beneficial. The benefit has been shown with the dollar
saving that the Navy has experienced over the last few years
in its drive to compete its procurements. There definitely
are benefits to using competition. In Deputy Defense Secre-
tary Frank C. Carlucci's Acquisition Improvement Program of
32 initiatives, competition was included as a key element.
In a memorandum of July 1981 Mr. Carlucci said:
We believe that it reduces the cost of needed supplies and
services, improves contractor performance, helps to combat
rising costs, increases the industrial base, and ensures
fairness of opportunity for award of government contracts.
[Ref. 28:pg. 29]
Other benefits to using competition are thought to be
composed of the following:
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1. cuts down on or prevents waste;
2. allows greater opportunity for the Government to
receive the best value for the goods and services that
are required
;
3. quality and design are improved;
4. cuts down on the amount of time required for a pro-
gram;
5. increases innovation and the technological base;
6. reduces the need for cost and pricing data;
7. improves management and reduces contract
administration, and;
8. restores public confidence. [Ref. 27:pg. 100]
The literature that the researcher reviewed was, for the
most part, quiet on the subject of disadvantages concerning
competition. It isn't known, by the researcher, if this is
because there are no disadvantages to competition or if it
is because competition is in vogue at the present and most
of the writers are not prone to criticizing it. The only
references that the researcher found that criticized com-
petition were in the context of the CICA. This focused on
the potential loss or erosion of the industrial base because
CICA is opening competition to foreign companies. [Ref.
3:pg. 8] The only other references to problems associated with
competition were that the process
,
not competition
itself, is the true culprit responsible for any disadvan-
tages associated with competition. [Ref. 29:pg. 15]
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In summary, competition for competition sake is probably
not a good idea. If used properly, though, competition is
of benefit and should be used even if it were not required
by the CICA. This subject (CICA) will be explored in
greater detail in the next section of this chapter on com-
petition in the Federal Government.
C. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND CICA
The Congress has become extremely interested in the
Federal Government's procurement process during the decade
of the 80's. This interest has been manifested in the
increased use of competition. [Ref. 30:pg, 2] Congress has
now mandated competition through the passage of the Competi-
tion in Contracting Act of 1984. Competition as a means by
which the Federal Government would acquire goods and ser-
vices is not something that just recently appeared on the
scene. The statutory preference for competition in the
Government goes back at least to 1809 when the Congress
passed a law requiring that the Secretaries of Treasury,
War, and the Navy would use one of two methods for purchases
and contracts. These methods were by open purchase or by
asking for proposals through advertising. This was to pre-
vent favoritism and to provide the Government the benefits
of competition. [Ref. 27:pg. 2] This situation continued
for the next twenty years with the culmination in 1829 of an
interpretation by the Attorney General of the United States
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which stated that except in an instance where there was an
urgent need for the requirement, and performance was needed
immediately, that advertising was required. In 1860 a
statute was enacted that required formal advertising "for
all supplies and services purchased by a department of the
Federal Government". [Ref. 31:pgs. 4-5] During the Civil
War this was shunted aside with the passage of the Civil
Sundry Appropriations Act of 1861 by which procurements
would be made noncompe ti tively . This Act culminated in war
profiteering and scandals and was revised in 1874, 1878 and
again in 1910 by revised Statute 3709 which again required
formal advertising as the preferred method, with certain
exceptions. [Ref. 27:pg. 2] These exceptions were allowed
for various reasons. The first was in 1829 for urgency,
which came to be known as public exigency. This was
followed by one which allowed personal services to be ob-
tained by other than formal advertising. Other exceptions
allowed were; medical supply procurements (1845), foreign
purchases (1845), perishable goods (1847), purchases made
because of national emergencies (1864), small purchase
(1892), and when it was impractical to get competition
through formal advertising (1901). [Ref. 31:pg. 5] Formal
advertising then was the preferred method of procurement
until 1948. This was not the case during the World Wars but
after each conflagration we returned to this method. In
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1948 R. S. 3709 was determined to be archaic with its strict
requirement for formal advertising. It was felt in Congress
that under certain conditions the departments of the Govern-
ment that had proven during the Second World War that they
could use negotiation as a procurement technique and not be
wasteful should be allowed to continue the practice in
peacetime. This resulted in the signing in 1948 of the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, which cited formal
advertising as the preferred procurement method but
authorized 17 exceptions for the use of negotiated procure-
ment. This was the basis for much of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation which was subsequently written.
Formal Advertising remained the preferred method (with 17
exceptions) through two rewrites of the procurement regula-
tions until 1984 when CICA was passed. [Ref. 27:pgs. 3-6]
The major change implemented by this Act was to make
negotiation a recognized alternative to formal advertising
by setting up two methods for procurement by the Government;
sealed bid (which replaced formal advertising) and competi-
tive proposals. Prior to the passage of CICA, the atti-
tude of the Government was changing from one where a large
percentage of the purchases were of a sole source nature to
one ensuring that more competition was used. Within the DOD
there was the call by Secretary Carlucci to use competition
to reduce costs (as previously mentioned). This was
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followed on 10 November 1981 with a raemorandura from the
office of the Under Secretary of Defense that expanded on
the call for more competition by requesting each agency to:
1. Designate individuals at each procuring activity who
are advocates for competition with the responsibility
of insuring that opportunities for competition are not
lost or foreclosed by restrictive need statements,
unnecessarily detailed specifications, poor procure-
ment planning, or by arbitrary action, (underline
added)
2. Establish realistic but challenging goals for
increasing competition in all buying organizations.
3. Insure that each commander who has a procurement
function within his organization understands his
responsibility for maximum feasible competition.
4. Make competition in systems development and production
a matter of special emphasis. Acquisition strategy
should be developed . . . early in the acquisition
cycle . . . . [ Ref
.
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This was followed later on by a memorandum from the Secre-
tary of Defense on 9 September 1982. In this memo the
SECDEF stated that he was "convinced that we must give
greater attention to obtaining competition in the placement
of contracts" by the agencies within the DoD. He went on
to say that the use of other than competitive means would be
used only if fully justified and that no purchase action
would be excluded from this requirement, nor would it be
excused just because some one of high rank or level desired
it. [Ref. 33] President Reagan made competition an issue
for the entire Federal Government in 1983 with an 11 August
memo to all of the heads of the departments and agencies.
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The memo stated that except for mandated programs, such as
contracting with minority firms and handicapped persons,
that all "unwarranted use of noncompetitive practices must
and will be curtailed " (underline added). He then asked
each of them to ensure that competition was the preferred
method of procurement in their departments. It should be
noted that this was still only the preferred method and was
not as of yet Congressionally mandated.
DOD is a large and complex organization that employs in
excess of three million people in 5600 installations world-
wide and executes some 15 million contracts every year.
[Ref. 34:pg. 1] It would stand to reason then that some
procurements that were transacted by the DOD would result in
problem procurements. Sherman states in the opening of his
book that:
. . . the first edition of this book was published in
September, 1981. The media series was already in progress
at that time reporting on numerous and now infamous pur-
chases of furniture, plastic caps, hammers, coffee pots,
chips and other items. The reports dealt with various
forms of overpricing or deficient quality. A few . . .
reflected fraudulent acts .... Most involved poor
judgment or poor management. [Ref. 35:pg. 1]
Congress, in a reaction to all of the bad press the Govern-
ment, and in particular the DOD, was receiving, began the
process of trying to correct the situation by passing legis-
lation that, in essence, required more competition. The
culmination of the process was the passage in 1984 of three
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laws: the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, the
Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1984, and the Small Busi-
ness and Federal Procurement Competition Enhancement Act of
1984. [Ref. 27:pg. 102] (The latter two will not be ad-
dressed here as the first appears to have the greater amount
of coverage and recognition. They both were to complement
CICA and addressed specific areas of concern.) Public Law
98-369 (CICA) "is likely to have the greatest long term
impact on the contracting operations of the government".
[Ref. 35:pg. 119] The Act took several of the key points
from an earlier recommendation made by the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy that had been submitted to Congress in
1982. These recommendations or ideas were:
1. Use of advance procurement planning to obtain full and
open competition,
2. Simplifying and streamlining the procurement process,
3. Promoting the use of commercial products, whenever
practicable,
4. Requiring the use of functional specifications,
whenever practicable. [Ref. 36:pg 29]
However, it took an action by Senator William Cohen (R-ME)
to get the Act introduced. He accomplished this by
attaching the bill to the Deficit Reduction Act as an
amendment. [Ref. 34:pg. 2] The Act amended the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act, the Armed Services
Procurement Act and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
Act. CICA changed substantially the process of the
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Government contracting system, with the greatest change
being the abandonment of formal advertising as the preferred
method of procurement. It now accords equal status to
competitive negotiation as a method of obtaining goods and
services. This reverses almost two centuries of tradition.
[Ref. 35:pg. 120] The Act, by according equal status to
competitive negotiation, eliminates the seventeen exceptions
that were used to justify not using formal advertising.
Additionally it limits the use of other than full and open
competition. [Ref. 36:pg. 29] It does allow non-competitive
types of procurement to be used by the DOD but limits this to
only seven exceptions:
1. If there is only one available, responsible source,
and other property or services are not available for
substitution .
2. Serious injury to the government would occur if the
urgency was such that competition would be
detrimental
.
3. Restriction is needed to maintain the industrial base
or for research and development work.
4. There is an international agreement.
5. If there is a statute that authorizes or requires less
than full and open competition.
6. If there are National Security reasons.
7. If it is in the Public interest. [Ref. 37:pg. 6-3&5]
These exemptions, according to one author, have been diffi-
cult to interpret. Colleen Preston, cites two examples of
this; (a) no clear authority exists to exclude sources to
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comply with the Buy American Act and (b) it does not allow
for companies to be excluded where an organizational con-
flict of interest exists. Finally, she claims that less
than full and open competition is frowned upon and will hurt
a purchasing activity statistically where there are percen-
tage goals for obtaining new competition. [Ref. 39:pg. 6]
From this one can draw the conclusion that even though there
are exceptions that are allowed to be exercised, the actual
incident will be minimal.
CICA established other things in addition to full and
open competition, such as a new bid protest procedure. This
has been causing some difficulty because of the ability of a
contractor to stop action on a contract by simply filing a
protest with GAO. This stops all action on the process until
GAO has the time to review and render a decision. The Act
also lowered the threshold requiring certified cost and
pricing data to be submitted under the Truth in Negotiations
Act (TINA) from $500,000 to $100,000. It did not require,
though, that the Government audit every certification that
was submitted. [Ref. 29:pg. 8] In the researcher's opinion,
the fact the data is required to be submitted will almost
certainly cause it to be audited, if only to cover the
contracting officer in the event that someone claims that
the Government is paying too much for a contract. Finally,
the CICA established Sealed Bidding and Competitive
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Proposals as the methods for obtaining full and open
competition and to ensure that full and open competition is
obtained the Office of the Competition Advocate was
established .
In summary, CICA has not been with us long enough to
pass full judgment on all of the supposed benefits and
problems associated with it. It does appear though that by
using full and open competition the Navy has been experi-
encing substantial savings, the extent of which will be
explored and reported in the next section on competition in
the Navy.
D. COMPETITION IN THE NAVY.
The Navy General Counsel determined, prior to implement-
ation of CICA, that competition was a requirement imposed by
regulation. A 1983 memorandum, prepared by the General
Counsel for the Secretary of the Navy, reviewed a recent
case wherein the Court determined that the Navy had a res-
ponsibility to pursue competition. The suit in question
concerned an award for overhaul of aircraft which the Navy
had decided to sole source. The Navy's sole source deter-
mination was based on its finding that the original manufac-
turer was the only source capable of performing the work
within the schedule required and at an acceptable technical
risk level. Another aircraft maintenance firm protested the
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award and the Court found that the Navy had been correct in
awarding the first 20 of 49 aircraft on a sole source basis.
The Court then told the Navy to study the prospect in great
detail and compete the remaining aircraft. The Navy stone-
walled this order for two years and the Court allowed some
of the remaining aircraft to be sole sourced , but again
ordered the Navy to study and report back on the possibility
of competing the remaining aircraft. The Navy once again
did not, to the Court's satisfaction, perform as ordered.
Specifically, the Court found that the Navy had relied on the
manufacturer's estimates and had not made any real attempt
to pursue competition. The Court further determined that
the Navy "had violated" the requirements for competition and
had acted in "bad faith"in its maneuvers with the Court and
its orders. The Navy was ordered to pay litigation costs to
the competitor and faced, at the time of the writing of the
memo "several hundred thousand dollars" in punitive awards.
The Court, in its determination of this case, dealt with 10
U.S. Code Section 2304(g) and DAR 3-101(d) that required
competition to be persued and questioned the Navy's commit-
ment to this pursuit. The Court was not finding in these
statutes and regulations that competition was only pre-
ferred. Instead there was an obligation for the contracting
officer, once he determined that competition was not feas-
ible, to act in whatever necessary capacity to preclude this
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non-competitive status for subsequent procurements. The
Navy counsel concluded that there was no deliberate effort
by Naval personnel to "avoid procurement laws or thwart the
Court's order." He felt that instead there was an "institu-
tional bias for noncompetitive contracting." [Ref. 38]
The opinion of the counsel that there was an institu-
tional bias for sole source procurement in the Navy is not
surprising to the researcher. Secretary Lehman has not been
totally unsuccessful in beginning to fight this bias as can
be seen in the graph that shows competitive awards for the
years during which the case was being decided (see Figure
2). As can be seen by this graph, the percentage of awards
had risen from a low of 25% in 1981 to 30.5% by 1983, the
year of the counsel's memo. Also in 1983, the Secretary
appointed a Competition Advocate General effective 12 July
1983. [Ref. 39] This new Competition Advocate General (CAG)
had as his responsibility the implementation of "new
competition initiatives for programs such as subcontracting,
contractor support services, and resources for multiple
sourcing." [Ref. 40:pg. 1] Organizationally the CAG was
placed under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship-
building and Logistics) but reported to both the Assistant
Secretary and the Chief of Naval Material. [Ref. 41] In a
November memorandum to the competition advocates at the
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Figure 2 Navy Competitive Awards
Reproduced from material provided by the Office
of the Navy Competition Advocate General
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He voiced strongly the policy of obtaining competition
wherever practicable and gave the advocates some specific
guidance as follows:
1. Show your commitment to competitive contracting by
actions as well as words.
2. Independently determine the adequacy of sole-source
justifications as you review proposed sole-source
awards
.
3. Encourage planning of each procurement to maximize
competition, with particular attention to new starts,
including research and development.
4. Ensure that specifications do not exceed minimum
government requirements, and expand the use of
commercial specifications.
5. Consider obtaining data packages for use in competitive
solicitations .
6. Make the performance of market research a routine part
of the procurement process.
7. Look hard at follow on buys.
8. Reevaluate contractors' claims to proprietary rights
in data.
9. See that your command's contracting, technical, and
program management people are afforded the opportunity
to be trained in competitive practices.
10. Improve communications.
11. Pay particular attention to contractor support service
awards proposed as sole source.
12. Take extreme care with unsolicitated proposals. [Ref,
42: pg 6-8]
The CAG closed this memo with the admonition that competi-
tion in the Navy regarding procurement was going to in-
crease. Apparently the emphasis being placed on competition
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took seed during the first year of the tenure of the new
CAG. On August 13 of 1984 the CAG released his first year
report to his competition advocates in the field. It stated
that
:
1. competition goals for the previous year had been
reached
2. there had been significant savings directly attribut-
able to competition,
3. the goals for FY 1984 were going to be reached, and
4. overall the Navy had performed very well in competing
its purchases. (Figure 3)
Of note in this update was the admonition to the advocates
that competition for the sake of competition was not appro-
priate and that if a sole source procurement made more
business sense, then the advocate should "promptly recommend
approval of a . . . sole source award and move on to other
issues." [Ref. 43: pg. 4]
On April 1, 1985 the GIGA became effective. At that
time the GAG was now required statutorily and the competi-
tion advocates were given new authority to ensure that full
and open competition was the order of business in the Navy.
[Ref. 44: pg. 2]
With the emphasis on procurement both before and after
the passage of GIGA the natural question is; what have been
the results for the Navy? To get the answers to that
question one need only turn to the FY85 annual report on
Navy procurement to the Gongress. It was reported that
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Figure 3 FY 1984 Com.petitive Procurement Statistics
Department of the Navy
Reproducec^ from material provided by the Office
of the Navy Competition Advocate General
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during FY 1985 the Navy awarded $20.2 billion dollars
competitively, placed 69% of its actions competitively,
competed $1.7 billion of its spare parts and was increasing
the amount of subcontractor competition. [Ref. 45] Since
then the Navy has raised these figures and met all goals for
FY 1986. Half of all procurement dollars are now competed,
almost three quarters of all transactions are competed and
competitive awards exceed 21 billion dollars. Other sign-
ificant gains were reached in the areas of spare parts
(41%), Contracted Advisory and Assistance Services (65%) and
small purchases were competed for over 75% of the trans-
actions. This is of import because it indicates that the
"grass roots" businesses are being reached and that there
are "expanded opportunities to enter the Navy marketplace".
[Ref. 46]
In summary it would appear to be evident that the Navy
has been serious about competition for several years and
that once it was decided that competition was to become a




IV. THE PROCUREMENT WORKSHOPS
A. INTRODUCTION
Since 1983, Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), has
conducted procurement workshops in conjunction with local
Congressman's staff and personnel in the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics), for the small
business community. The first workshop occurred on 14 March
1983 and was conducted for Congressman Mollohan of West
Virginia. [Ref. 47] The workshops are not formally mandated
in that objectives are not stated in writing nor is there a
written mission statement. Rather they are an informal
service provided for Congressman who are interested in
having the Navy provide personnel to brief the business
people in their district on how to sell to the Navy and the
Department of Defense. As of September, 1986 approximately
ninety workshops have been conducted. Some have been very
well attended and others have had minimal success in getting
local businesses to attend. [Ref. 47] The average workshop
numbers between seventy five and one hundred fifty partici-
pants. Several workshops included over a thousand partici-
pants but were extremely unwieldy and not very productive.
[Ref. 48] The best size for the most benefit to the
attendees are those where less than one hundred fifty
business people attend. According to LCDR Law this is a very
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manageable number that allows the most information to be
dispensed to the greatest number of people and still allow
questions and direct contact between the Navy and the busi-
ness people involved.
B. HISTORY .
In an interview with Admiral Sansone it was learned that
he was responsible for initiating the present day workshops.
Prior to the workshops of today, according to the Admiral,
there was a program called the Federal Procurement
Conference (FPC) , that was used as a platform to attempt to
reach the business community, and to educate the business
people in how to do business with the Government. These
conferences were "very big, too general, . . . and there was
no individual help", for the business people who were atten-
ding who had problems, or for those who had questions and
did not understand the process. [Ref. 49] Admiral Sansone
stated that while he was at the Pentagon serving in the
Small Business Program in 1968, the FPC fell into neglect
and declined into a totally ineffective program. By 1978,
when Admiral Sansone (then serving as Deputy Chief of Naval
Material for Contracts and Business Management (CBM)) was
traveling the country with then Secretary of the Navy
Hildalgo, he noted that the business community wanted help.
He became convinced that a program such as the present
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one was needed. "A small program that would focus on the
Navy given by the Navy leaders in the field would work."
[Ref. 49] The Admiral felt the personal approach was
needed. He thought this would help generate more competi-
tion by enabling the small business person to find out that
it was not impossible to find one's way through the maze of
what were perceived as the difficult acquisition regulations
the Navy used in its' contracting process. Acting on this
perceived need to have a program that would effectively aid
the small business person in getting over the first hurdle
and become knowledgeable on how to do business with the
Government, Admiral Sansone, directed that his personnel
work with the OLA to set up the program. The CBM was a
staff position at NAVMAT and was responsible for estab-
lishing business policy for the Systems Commands.
(see Figure 4)
C. TODAY
The program has not deviated greatly from the way that
Admiral Sansone set it up. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) now acts as
the Navy focal point to support the program with personnel
to provide the briefings, because NAVMAT has been disestab-
lished. NAVMAT was disestablished in 1985 because SECNAV
wanted to remove a layer of bureaucracy that he felt was



































Figure 4 Organization of the Department of the Navy
Reproduced fron instructional material provided in
"Financial Management in the Armed Forces" course
at NPS.
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authority some of the staff functions that NAVMAT used to
oversee and that he felt were necessary for the effective
management of the acquisition process. One of the staff
functions that moved was the CBM. They remain responsible
for providing the people that do the brief and the informa-
tion that goes into the brief. (Figure 5) According to LCDR
Bob Law of the OLA, the briefer is always a Supply Corps
Admiral. The significance of the Navy using an Admiral to
do the brief is in itself of import. What this shows to the
business people, who attend the workshop, is that the Navy
is serious in trying to get their message across. It is
impressive to have a Navy Admiral address the audience.
This is not just the researcher's opinion. Several of the
attendees expressed this feeling in conversations with the
researcher. They felt that this showed a real commitment on
the part of the Navy in trying to help them. The use of a
Supply Corps Admiral is also significant, because the Supply
Corps is the business management unit of the Navy. It is
the community that is the closest approximation in terras of
business related matters to the civilian business community.
A perusal of the brochures announcing the workshops, that
the researcher was able to obtain, shows the Admirals that
















Figure 5 Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Shipbuilding & Logistics)
Reproduced from SECKAVINST 4200. 39A of 24 MAY 1985.
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business management. All had held several different
procurement related jobs during their careers and were rec-
ognized leaders in the field of procurement.
The workshop attended by the researcher was essentially
the same as what Admiral Sansone, in our interview, des-
cribed as the workshop that he and his personnel estab-
lished. The format for the workshop that the researcher
attended was as follows:
1 . Opening Remarks
The Admiral began the program by stating the purpose
of the workshop. This, essentially, was how the person
sitting in the audience could do business with the Navy.
After this opening statement he set the agenda (Figure 6)
for the morning brief. During this part of the brief the
Admiral used the analogy of a Ruble's cube to describe how he
imagined the attendees felt when faced with trying to do
business with the Government. In the beginning the business-
person would look upon doing business with the Government,
with the regulations and paperwork required, with the same
attitude as one looks at a Ruble's cube when trying to solve
it. Much of the time the person would feel complete and
total frustration, which would lead them to think that it
could not be done. The Admiral felt though that after the
brief the audience would at the very least know where to get









Reproduced from material provided by the Office of
Asst SECNAV (S & L)
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2. The Movie
The next item was a movie that was intended pri-
marily to instill excitement and generate enthusiasm with
its depiction of hustling Navy personnel busily performing
their assigned tasks. Underneath all of the excitement of
airplanes taking off and landing on the pitching deck was a
second message. At the end of the film the Admiral stated
that the carrier represented a 5,500 person floating city
that made up a potential market for many of the goods and
services that the business people in the audience could pro-
vide. To emphasize this, a transparency was shown that
listed several of the common items that could be supplied by
the business people present. (Figure 7)
3. The Brief
The majority of the rest of the morning session
dealt with the agenda as shown at Figure 6, The first item
discussed was statistical data that showed the total FY85
DOD contracting effort in dollars by Service. This total
was 158 billion dollars with the Navy spending 52.1 billion
dollars of that total. (Figure 8) The next transparency
was of particular interest to many in the audience. It
showed the amount of the contract actions and contract
dollars that went for small purchases vice large contracts.
(Figure 9) It was pointed out that the 3,106,000 small



















375.000 MEALS PER MONTH
$2 M INVENTORY
$3 M ANNUAL SALES
$750,000 INVENTORY
Figure 7 A Nuclear Carrier
Reproduced from material provided by the Office of
the ASST SECNAV (S & L)
61
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING
FY 1985 ($ BILLIONS)
52.1
53.3
ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE DLA
Figure 8
Departraent of Defense Contracting FY 1985
Reproduced from material provided by the Office




CONTRACTS / PURCHASE ORDERS (000)
SMALL PURCHASE 3,106 (97%)
LARGE CONTRACTS 82 (3%)
DOLLARS (BILLIONS)
SMALL PURCHASE 3.4 (6%)
LARGE CONTRACTS 48.7 (94%)
Figure 9 Navy Contract Statistics FY 1985
Reproduced from material provided by the ASST
SECNAV (S & L)
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real opportunity for many in the audience. The Admiral then
discussed the contracting environment. This environment is
made up of numerous statutes, regulations, directives and
policies. These are the concerns primarily of the contract-
ing officer and should not (emphasis was placed on the
"should not") impede the smaller businesses that wished to
do business with the Government. The remainder of this
section of the brief dealt with the contracting activities
that placed many of the requirements for the goods and
services that the audience could provide. (Figure 10) The
Admiral finished this part of the brief by showing the
number of the 3,106,000 contract actions (small purchases)
that were placed by the field contracting offices. He
stated that these actions which totaled 12,5 billion dol-
lars, represented the best opportunity for the smaller busi-
nesses to receive a piece of the Navy's business. The
Admiral then pointed out the amount of the 12.5 billion that
went to small business (Figure 11) and that if the purchase
action was less than 25,000 dollars, the Navy was required
to award to a small business concern if possible. The last
part of the contracting environment that was discussed had
to do with Figure 9 subcontracting opportunities. It was
pointed out that of 46.1 billion dollars (DoD) that went to
small business, 20.1 billion dollars was to subcontractors.
(Figure 12)
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TOTAL SMALL BUSINESS AWARDS $7.0 BILLION
SMALL BUSINESS SET ASIDE
SMALL & DISADVANTAGED - 8(A) PROGRAM
SMALL & DISADVANTAGED - DIRECT
WOMAN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS






Figure 11 Navy Small Business Awards FY 85
Reproduced from material provided by the Office of theASST SECNAV (S & L)
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DIRECT TO DOP vs SUBCONTRACTOR
S26.0B $20.18
Figure 12 Snail Business
Reproduced from material provided by the Office of
the ASST SECNAV (S & L)
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The next item on the agenda for the brief was the
"How to". This encompassed five areas (Figure 13) and was
the most lengthy and detailed item on the agenda. The first
area discussed, was how to make the capabilities of the
contractor known to the Government. The Admiral pointed out
that the best tool to use to learn how to do this was a
pamphlet entitled Selling to the Military . (Figure 14)
According to the briefing material the publication was
important because of the information that it provided to the
business person. This included information on the Bidders
Mailing List, the Government's system of specifications, and
the numerous sources of information needed by the business
person that would enhance his ability to contract with the
Government. After discussing this important piece of ,
information, the Admiral turned to the Commerce Business
Daily (CBD). He pointed out to the audience how to obtain
the CBD (by subscription or at the Library) and that it
presented to the potential contractor a synopsis of the
Government's needs and requirements. He then explained to
the business people how to use the CBD.
The next area covered information on prime and sub-
contracting. In this part of the brief the rest of the
publications made available to the audience were commented
on and explained. These publications were:
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^'Li/f^BSJ T*Oktf
• MAKE CAPABILITIES KNOWN
© CONTRACT AS A PRIME CONTRACTOR
© CONTRACT AS A SUBCONTRACTOR
© OBTAIN AVAILABLE HELP
AVOID PITFALLS
Figure 13 "How To"
Reproduced from material provided by the Office







Figure 14 Make Capabilities Known
Reproduced from material provided by the Office of
the ASST SECNAV (S & L)
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a. Navy Small and Disadvantaged Business Personnel
Directory . The purpose of this directory is to
establish improved communication with small firms so
that the Navy may take full advantage of their
innovative ideas and capabilities, thereby achieving
significant savings in contracting for research and
development services as well as production items.
[Ref. 50: pg. 1]
b
.
DOD Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
Specialists . This directory does essentially the same
as the Navy directory except on a DOD basis. It lists
by state and region the people tasked with helping the
small and disadvantaged business person establish and
maintain a relationship with the Government. [Ref. 51]
c. Small Business Subcontracting Directory . This is a
compilation of DOD prime contractors with the name and
number of their Small Business Liaison Officer. Also
included is their product or service that is being
provided to DOD. [Ref. 52]
d Guide to the Defense Contracting Regulations for Small
Business, Small Disadvantaged Business and Women-owned
Small Business . This guide explains, in simple
language, the basic purchasing rules and regulations
of the Department of Defense. [Ref. 53:pg. v]
Though all of the publications are important and should be
used by those wishing to do business as a prime or subcon-
tractor, the Admiral stated that the last of these was, in
his estimation, the most important. He felt that this one
explained all that the business person needed to get started
in contracting with the Government. The Admiral then
finished the "How to" portion of the brief with a discussion
of the "Six Myths" of contracting with the Government
(Figure 15) These were six problems or concerns that busi-
ness had stated as being reasons that they did not want to




o DON'T MAKE WHAT THEY BUY
• DON'T PAY ON TIME
o ONLY BUY FROM PRIMES
• MONEY NO OBJEa
Figure 15 Myths
Reproduced from material provided by the Office
of the ASST SECNAV (S & L)
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myths were discussed, with the Admiral offering rebuttal on
why each was not true.
The final part of the brief dealt with avoiding
pitfalls. This actually was more of a dissertation on how
the Navy and DoD had, through the use of competition, begun
combating the allegations of waste and mismanagement that
had cropped up recently. The Buy Our Spares Smart (BOSS)
program was discussed as one solution, to the allegation of
cost mismanagement, for the Navy. Statistical data were
presented that portrayed how the Navy, through the use of
this and other competition measures, had reduced the price
to the Government for many of the goods that it required.
It was pointed out that this program benefited the smaller
businesses because of its policy of breaking out the spares
business from the prime that manufactured the system. The
spare parts were now being competed which opened up more
opportunities for the smaller businesses to compete and win
contracts
.
The Admiral, in summing up the lengthy presentation
which lasted several hours, stated that the best way for
those in the audience to succeed was to provide timely





• - ' * ' .. .«
l; 34 15 a* 17 n 3*
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at a Reasonable Price
Figure 16 Formula for Success
Reproduced from material provided by the Office of




Immediately after the formal brief by the Admiral,
he threw the floor open to questions. The audience, which
was comprised of men and women in various modes of dress
from business suits to open necked shirts and work boots,
for the most part did not ask questions of the Admiral.
There were a few, though, and these dealt primarily with
problems contractors were experiencing on current contracts.
The problems discussed all had to do with late payment by
the Government. The Admiral was not able to give an answer
on the spot. He did give out his office phone number and
asked those present who had a problem now, or in the future,
to please call and he assured them that they would receive
an answer.
This ended the workshop for the morning session.
Those who were interested were asked to return that after-
noon for an opportunity to meet with the small business
representatives of the major defense contractors.
5 Afternoon Session
That afternoon the major defense contractors had
tables set up with material explaining their company's
policy towards obtaining subcontractors. In attendance were
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the procurement officers or the small business representa-
tive from Grumman, Lockheed, Sperry, McDonnell Douglas,
Raytheon and Harris Corporation. This representation by the
major defense contractor at the workshop was, according to
LCDR Law, not a regular item. Their presence was dependent
on two factors. The first was if the Congressman desired
them to be present. The second and overriding factor was if
the estimated attendance would warrant the time, effort and
cost that the major defense contractors would expend. If
the number was estimated to be too few then the representa-
tives were not asked to come. [Ref. 47]
D. SUMMARY
The brief by the Admiral, though lengthy, was not of the
detail that would allow the small business person to
immediately bid on and successfully receive a contract with
the Navy. However, it was, in the researcher's opinion quite
good from the aspect of giving information needed by the
attendees to allow them to begin doing business with the
Government. It gave them the wherewithal to seek the infor-
mation to enable them to become competitive. The presenta-
tion gave the impression that it was not impossible to do
business with the Government provided that the business
person is willing to put forth the needed effort to under-
stand the regulations the Government has to work with. It
was emphasized that even though it was not impossible to be
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successful, there were pitfalls that had to be avoided and
it was not as simple as doing business in the commercial
world
.
A point made by Admiral Sansone concerning the workshops
was that, with the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984
(CICA) and the establishment of the Competition Advocate
General's, it might be thought that there would no longer be
a need for the procurement workshop in the future. The
Admiral stated that even though competition is required by
the passage of CICA, and more emphasis placed by establish-
ment of the CAG, the Navy still needs this program. There
is a fear on the part of small business people that the
process is difficult to understand and it is too hard to
become involved. The procurement workshops could be used as
a vehicle to help those that were hanging back by showing
that it wasn't impossible. The Admiral's contention was
that the workshops were effective and desired by the busi-
ness community. He felt the personal approach was not





A questionnaire was used by the researcher to gather
responses from the business people who attended the procure-
ment workshops.
The objectives of the questionnaire were threefold:
(1) to provide formal feedback to the Department of the
Navy to allow them to assess the workshops and
determine if they needed to be revised in order to
better serve the audience that they were trying to
reach
,
(2) to determine if the respondents to the questionnaire
felt that the workshops had been worth the effort of
attending in that they had benefited by receiving
information that would allow them to attempt to
do business with the Government,
(3) to attempt to determine if the workshops were
successful in the stated objectives of strengthening the
DIB and increasing competition in the small business arena.
In the development of the questionnaire Mr. Stanley
Payne's book, The Art of Asking Questions
,
was used to
provide guidance on how to write the questions. An attempt
was made to have as few open ended questions as possible and
to use questions that would have set answers which the
respondent could simply check off. With some of the
questions this was not possible, but these were kept to a
minimum and were descriptive in nature. They were used to
gather information about the respondent's company. The
questionnaire is included as Appendix A and the reason for
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the use of each question will be discussed in this section
The data will be presented and discussed in Chapter Six.
B. THE QUESTIONS
1 . How did you become aware of the Navy Procurement
Workshop?
a. Notification by the Dept. of the Navy
b. Notification by Congressman




This question was intended to provide information to the Navy
as to the method/medium by which the respondent was made aware
of the workshop
.
2. A. What type of material/service does your business
produce/perform?
B. What is your primary Standard Industrial
Classification code (SIC)?
The purpose of these two questions was to allow the
researcher to attempt to classify the respondent's company as
either a manufacturing or service company.
3. Please state the first 3 digits of your zip code.
This question should allow the researcher to ascertain the
general area of the country that the respondent was from.
4. Please indicate the approximate number of your
employees.
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5. What approximately is the annual sales figure for
your company rounded to the nearest thousand dollars?
These two questions were used to determine if the company or
business of the respondent was small or large.








This question allowed the researcher to determine the
respondent's experience level in dealing with the DOD.
7. Why did you attend the workshop?
a. curiosity
b. problem with current contract
c. wanted information




f sell to Govt
.
g other
This question was used to determine the reason for their
attendance. Were they seriously interested in the workshop
or merely curious? Were they there to learn how to sell to
the Navy and Government or to see their congressman because
of a problem?
8. Prior to your attendance at the workshop, did you
feel that you knew how to sell to the Government?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
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This question was an attempt to determine if they felt they
had enough knowledge of the acquisition process used by the
Government to allow them to sell to the Government,
9. A. Had you bid on a Government contract prior to
attending the workshop?
As a prime contractor
As a subcontractor
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
C. Yes ( ) D. No ( )
B. If yes, did you receive the award of the
contract?
As a prime contractor
As a subcontractor
A. Yes ( )
C. Yes ( )
B. No ( )






C. If no, what was the reason?
a. bid was too high
b. didn't understand process
c. found to be not responsive by
contracting officer
d. problems with Prime
e. other
These questions were used to determine if the respondent had
bid on a contract before attending the workshop and to see
if she had received the award. If she had not been success-
ful then the last part (C) would show the reason.
10. A
B
Did you have a Government contract that you
were currently working on when you attended the
workshop?
As a prime contractor
As a subcontractor
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
C. Yes ( ) D. No ( )
If yes, were you having difficulty with the
contract?
As a prime contractor
As a subcontractor
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
C. Yes ( ) D. No ( )
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c. late payment or nonpayment
d. audit procedures
e. other
These questions were used to determine if the respondent had
a contract at the time of his attending the workshop and to
find out the nature of the problem.
11. A. If you had a contract and were having a problem,
did you receive information from the workshop on
how to resolve it?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
B. If no, what was the reason?
a. too many people, couldn't ask for help
b. asked question, got run around
c. didn't understand answer
d. forum did not allow for questions
e. other
C. If yes, were you able to resolve the problem?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
D. If no, what was the reason?
a. guidance was faulty
b. did not understand guidance
c. asked question incorrectly
d. Navy did not have answer




These questions were used to determine if the respondent had
a problem on a current contract, did he receive information
that allowed him to correct the problem. These questions
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were applicable only if the respondent was working on a
Government contract and had a problem.
12. If, after attending the workshop, you bid on a
Government contract, either in a prime or
subcontract capacity, and were successful, do you
feel that your attendance at the procurement
workshop was instrumental in your receiving the
award?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
This question was a measurement of the effectiveness of the
procurement workshops in getting information to the atten-
dees that would allow them to successfully do business with
the Government,
13. If no, please state briefly why you feel that the
workshop did not help in your obtaining an award.
This question was a follow on to number twelve and hopefully
would provide constructive criticism which would allow the
Navy to change its program if it felt the necessity.
14. A, If you have not done business with the
Government do you intend to in the future?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )




d. instability of govt business






15. A. If you are doing business with the Government,
do you intend to quit?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
B. If no, what is the reason?
a. late payments or nonpayment ( )
b. burdensome paperwork ( )
c. delays in making ( )
d. had problems with current
contract, tried to get help at
the workshop and didn't ( )
e. more attractive commercial
ventures ( )
f. unfair application of regulations ( )
8 inflexible procurement policies ( )
h. other ( )
The previous two questions were included to determine if the
people attending the workshops were going to attempt to do
business with the Government if they had not, or if they were
currently doing business, were they going to quit? From the
responses the researcher felt that the effectiveness of the
workshop in attaining the objectives of strengthening the
DIB and increasing competition could be measured.
16. How would you rate the workshop in respect to the
amount of information and understanding that you
received by attending?
good ( ) average ( ) poor ( )
17. Did you receive information at the workshop that you
previously had not known about?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
Questions sixteen and seventeen were intended to measure the
effectiveness of the briefing personnel in getting their
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message to the attendees that selling to the Government was
possible .
18. After attending the workshop did you feel that you
could now sell to the Government?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
This question was used to determine if the workshop had
helped those attendees who had answered no to question
number eight, but, after attending, now felt that they could
be successful in obtaining Government contracts.
19. If after attending the workshop you were successful
in obtaining a contract with DOD or other Government
agency, did the number of employees that you have:
increase ( ) , Amount
decrease ( ) , Amount
stay same ( )
This question was an attempt to determine if the workshops
had any effect on the labor force, for those respondents
that had been successful in receiving a Government contract.
20. Question number twenty was for information only for
the Navy and will be released only to the Navy OLA.
21. If you were conducting the workshop how would you
improve it?
a. make them smaller (fewer attendees)
b. have more of them
c. address problems (more presenters)
d. allow for more questions





This question was intended to provide the respondent the
means to critique the workshop, In addition, the responses
can be used by the Navy to alter the workshops methodology.
C. SUMMARY
The purpose of using a questionnaire was to provide
feedback to the Navy and determine the effectiveness of the
workshops in meeting their objectives.
The next chapter will discuss the respondents answers to
the questions with an attempt to analyze the answers.
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VI. RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
A. INTRODUCTION
Of the 90 workshops that had been conducted as of the
beginning of this study, the researcher attempted to obtain
lists of the attendees for 15 of them. LCDR Robert Law, of
the OLA picked the 15 that he felt the researcher would have
the best chance of obtaining. The criteria that he used to
pick the 15 were:
1. Date of the workshop. Workshops conducted in 1983
were not chosen. The reason for this was that the
likelihood of the Congressman's staff who had worked
on the project remaining in his employee was felt to
be small. Also, LCDR Law felt that the record of the
attendees having been retained would be minimal,
2. Personal knowledge. LCDR Law felt that it would be
better to pick the ones that he felt had had a good
attendance response and the Congressman's staff had
kept records of the attendees that included addresses.
The researcher then called a key staff person in the office
of the Congressman who had been chosen. Of the 15 called,
11 provided lists of attendees. The lists ranged from being
very detailed and complete concerning the information re-
quired, to a couple that were not sufficiently detailed to
provide an address for all attendees. However the lists
gave the researcher approximately 2,000 names from which to
sample. The researcher had decided to send from between 500
and 1000 questionnaires to the attendees depending on the
size of the population from who the sample would be drawn.
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Because of the slowness in receiving the questionnaires from
the staff members the researcher, at first, mailed question-
naires to all of the names on each list as it arrived. The
only elements excluded from the sample were those determined
to be representatives of a major defense company or
Government employees. This was done for approximately the
first 500 to 600 questionnaires mailed. The remaining
questionnaires were mailed on a random basis to the names
provided, again applying the exception of major defense
companies and Government employees. The reason for this was
because of the desire to sample the population as broadly as
possible without exceeding the 1,000 questionnaire limit.
Of the 1,000 questionnaires mailed, 249 were returned. How-
ever, only 239 could be used as part of the sample. The 10
that were not, only partially answered or the answers were
too incongruent.
One of the purposes of doing the questionnaire was to
try to measure the effectiveness of the workshops in
strengthening the DIB and increasing competition. The
researcher was able to conclude that these objectives were
reached. However, because of an inability to determine the
base from which to begin a measurement, the researcher could
















B. ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONS









By far the most effective method of notification was via the
congressional staff. This would be expected because of the
structure of the program that leaves the promotion of the
workshops to the congressional staffs. It appears that the
commercial advertising media has not been an effective
source of notification. Of the 58 that were marked other,
the largest number had been made aware of the workshop
through the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) (41). The
remaining 17 were informed by friends, supervisors and
professional organizations other than the chamber of commerce
2. A. What type of material/service does your business
produce/perform?
B. What is your primary Standard Industrial
Classification code (SIC)?
Using the information provided in question number 2, or,
where it was not clear, by calling the respondent, the
researcher classified the business of the attendee as either
a manufacturing or service company. Of the 239 respondents
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it was determined that 87 (36%) were manufacturing companies
and 152 (64%) were service companies. This finding is
reflective of the current status of business enterprises in
the country and substantiates the findings discussed in
Chapter 2 with regard to the diminishing manufacturing base.
3. Please state the first 3 digits of your zip code.
This question was for the use of the researcher and the
information obtained was not intended for release.
4, Please indicate the approximate number of your
employees
.
5. What approximately is the annual sales figure for
your company rounded to the nearest thousand dollars?
The answers to questions four and five were used in
conjunction with FAR, Part 19 (Small Business and Small
Disadvantaged Business Concerns) to determine if the
respondent was a small business or other than a small
business. The breakdown of the 239 respondents is as
follows
:
small - 193 (81%) large - 46 (19%)
Even though the sample was somewhat skewed by the fact
that the researcher made an effort to screen out known large
defense contractors, the number of large businesses screened
out of the sample was not significant.
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It is obvious that the majority of businessmen
attending the workshops were from small businesses. Though
not reflected in the presentation of the data, the majority
of the respondents classified as large businesses only
marginally exceeded the FAR criteria for small business. It
is apparent that the primary impact group is small
businesses. The findings of the research, will as a result,
be influenced by attitudes and perceptions of this group.



















The vast majority of respondents have done no business with
the Department of Defense. For those who had performed as
defense contractors the defense work was a very small
percentage of their business base. By their attendance at
the workshop, they indicated at least an interest in
increasing their DoD involvement. Their indicated lack of
DoD experience is not indicative of a total lack of Govern-
ment contracting experience. Several stated on the ques-
tionnaire that they had performed work for other agencies of
the Government.
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b. problem with current contract
c. wanted information
d. wanted to see congressman
e sell to Navy









The reasons for attendance at the workshops ran the gamut
of the answers provided. The numbers do not sum to 239
because, for this question, as in other instances, some
respondents checked more than one answer. As can be seen,
the preponderance of the respondents were seeking informa-
tion and were pursuing expanded opportunities to sell to the
Navy. Neither of these answers is particularly surprising
since the workshop was conducted by the Navy and the majori-
ty of the respondents had stated they had not had any sales
with the DoD,
8. Prior to your attendance at the workshop, did you
feel that you knew how to sell to the Government?
A. Yes 109 B. No 130
The researcher was surprised at the number of respondents
who indicated that they felt they knew how to sell to the
Government. Why would businessmen who knew how to sell
attend a "how to " workshop? It could be surmised that the
small businessmen were taking advantage of an opportunity to
reassure themselves that they did know what they thought
they knew.
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9. A. Had you bid on a Government contract prior to
attending the workshop?
As a prime contractor
As a subcontractor
A. Yes 127 B. No 112
C. Yes 76 D. No 163
B. If yes, did you receive the award of the
contract?






C. If no, what was the reason?
a. bid was too high
b. didn't understand process
c. found to be not responsive by
contracting officer
d. problems with Prime
e. other
The breakdown of the other category was as follows:
(1) solicitation was canceled 1
(2) not selected from short list 2
(3) contract was too large 2
(4) minority set aside 1






It is interesting to note that although only 109 respondents
indicated that they knew how to sell to the Government, 127
had actually bid on Government contracts. This phenomenon
will be discussed under correlations at the end of this
chapter. Of those who had bid, 63% had been successful as
primes and 75% had been successful as subcontractors. Of
those who were not sucessful, the predominant reason for
their not receiving the award was their bid was not the
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lowest submitted. It must be remembered, though, that where
there are more than two bidders, there will be more losers
than winners. Failure to understand the process and being
found not responsive were the next ranked areas of reasons
for not winning an award. If you don't understand the
system it is difficult to succeed in that system, particu-
larly a system as complex as Government contracting. By way
of example, in a conversation with one of the respondents,
he stated that he had lost several bids in the past because
he was not the lowest bidder. His complaint was that the
Government used this criterion all too often without con-
sidering the implications of this policy. He explained that
in many instances his bid included the service that he would
be able to give to the Government if he was awarded the
contract. However he noted that in many cases where he had
been beaten on price that the award had gone to a business
in another part of the country. His feeling was that these
businesses were only trying to get the fast dollar and to
not establish a long term relationship with the Government
activity in his area. He felt that the Government in this
instance suffered by the use of lowest price as the deter-
minant. This businessman rationalized his approach to the
bid in terras of his commercial business practice of estab-
lishing long term relationships with valued customers. He
failed to understand the process of sealed bid procurement
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methodology, wherein the lowest responsive and responsible
bidder receives the award. If the solicitation does not
call for follow-on service then the business person
competing for the award should cost out and price his bid
accordingly. The workshop could be very beneficial for
business people, like him, who are trying to compete by
ensuring that the process is understood.
10. A. Did you have a Government contract that you
were currently working on when you attended the
workshop?
As a prime contractor A. Yes 64 B. No 175
As a subcontractor C. Yes 34 D. No 215
B, If yes, were you having difficulty with the
contract?
As a prime contractor A. Yes 19 B. No 45
As a subcontractor C, Yes 7 D. No 27










The responses to these two parts of question number 10
indicate that a good number of the respondents were working
on a contract and that the ones who were operating as a
prime were experiencing more difficulty than those who were
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subcontracting. This could be expected from a population of
small business contractors where Government contracting
experience is limited and the primary business base is
composed of commercial contracts. The results of this ques-
tion were not of the magnitude to allow the researcher to
draw conclusions about the problems of people doing business
with the Government. However, the two largest problem areas,
burdensome paperwork and problems with specifications are
also discussed in the industrial base literature as being
barriers to entry and causes of firms leaving the defense
industrial base.
11. A. If you had a contract and were having a problem,
did you receive information from the workshop on
how to resolve it?
A. Yes 9 B. No 17
B. If no, what was the reason?
a. too many people, couldn't ask for help 8
b. asked question, got run around 5
c. didn't understand answer 3
d. forum did not allow for questions 1
C. If yes, were you able to resolve the problem?
A. Yes 9 B. No
The researcher observes that even though the number of
people that had problems and didn't receive the information
necessary to resolve the problem is small, in context to the
total numbers of people that attend the workshops, it is
still significant. The nature of the workshops is to foster
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good will in the business community and thereby seek to
increase competition and enhance the defense industrial
base. It should be easier to maintain a current competitor
than to entice a neophyte into the business. Failure to
adequately address the attendees problems is an area of
concern. It is worthy of note that the 9 respondents who
received information at the workshop concerning their prob-
lems were able to resolve their problems utilizing the
information gained..
12. If, after attending the workshop, you bid on a
government contract, either in a prime or subcon-
tract capacity, and were successful, do you feel
that your attendance at the procurement workshop
was instrumental in your receiving the award?
A. Yes 57 B. No 78
This question was only applicable if they had bid on a
contract after the workshop had been conducted. The
researcher had simplistically assumed that once the business
people had attended the workshop they would begin doing
business with the Government. Therefore, the researcher
made no provision for those that marked this as
nonapplicable , or left it blank, to comment on the reason
why they had not tried to obtain a contract. Several of the
respondents provided an answer even though they were not
asked for one. The reasons they gave for not having tried
to do business were; they had only recently attended a
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workshop and had not had time to digest the information
received, they could not qualify for the solicitations that
had been placed in their area, and nothing had been offered
in their area since they had attended. Of note is the fact
that a majority of the respondents had been awarded a
contract and of those 42% felt that the workshop had been
instrumental in the award of the contract. Keeping in mind
that with competition there are at least as many losers as
winners this could be an indication that the workshops were
effective in getting business people to understand the
process. Through this understanding they were then prone to
at temp t to bid
.
13. If no, please state briefly why you feel that the
workshop did not help in your obtaining an award.
Question number thirteen asked the respondent for an
explanation of why they answered "no" to question number
twelve. The majority (58 of 78) of the "no" answers to that
question were due to a feeling that the workshop had been
too general in nature and, therefore, not instrumental in
receiving the award. Sixteen of the remaining 20 felt that
either the bottom line in getting an award was low price (7
answers) and the workshop could not help with this or they
were old hands at the game and the workshop had only been a
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reassurance vehicle and a way to stay current (9 answers).
The remaining 4 who answered "no" to question number twelve
did not provide an explanation.
14. A. If you have not done business with the
Government do you intend to in the future?
A. Yes 80 B. No 18




d. instability of govt business










The question was included in an attempt to measure the
workshop's effectiveness in getting the attendees to at
least try to do business with the Government. Though not
conclusive, the overwhelming number of "yes" answers indicates
that the respondents are at least inclined to attempt to do
business with the Government in the future. This represents
a potential net increase in the defense industrial base and
should also lead to increased competition. If this is true
of the total population, approximately a third of the
attendees could attempt to enter the defense market.
15. A. If you are doing business with the Government,
do you intend to quit?
A . yes B . no 132
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B. If yes, what is the reason?
a. late payments or nonpayment 1
b. burdensome paperwork
c. delays in making 2
d. had problems with current
contract, tried to get help at
the workshop and didn't
e. more attractive commercial
ventures 2
f. unfair application of regulations 4
h. other 1
The overwhelming majority of the respondents answered "no"
to this question. It appears that the contractors who have
experience in Government contracting have found it to be
sufficiently rewarding to continue to participate.
16. How would you rate the workshop in respect to the
amount of information and understanding that you
received by attending?
good 115 average 101 poor 23
Ninety percent of the respondents indicated that the work-
shop met or exceeded their expectations. This would tend to
indicate that the workshops were generally structured to
meet the needs of the target population.
17. Did you receive information at the workshop that you
previously had not known about?
A. Yes 198 B. No 41
This question, along with the previous one (#16), was used
to measure the effectiveness of the briefings in getting
across their message to the attendees. Though not
conclusive, it is felt that the responses provided indicate
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that the material was presented in an effective manner and
the attendees benefited from their experience at the work-
shops. A greater understanding of the contracting process
should lead to increased participation and subsequent
success for the participants. This should have a positive
impact on both competition and the defense industrial base.
18. After attending the workshop did you feel that you could
now sell to the Government?
A. Yes 183 B. No 56
This is a marked increase of positive responses and a marked
decrease of negative responses when compared to question
number eight (yes-109, no-130) which asked if they felt they
could sell to the Government prior to their attendance at
the workshops. The increase in the number of "yes" answers
indicates the workshops were effective in informing the
attendees in how to do business with the Government. A
further comparison between these questions is made in the
section on correlations (section C)
.
19. If after attending the workshop you were successful in
obtaining a contract with DOD or other Government




Only one of the respondents gave the degree of the increase
and then only stated that it doubled, not indicating how
many workers there were in the beginning. Having received
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an award did not seem to have a significant effect on the
workforce size. This finding tends to indicate that busi-
nessmen who attended were not looking to the Government
market as a source of immediate growth, but were using the
Government business to displace less desirable commercial
business.





The information obtained from this question was intended for
the Navy OLA only.
21. If you were conducting the workshop how would you
improve it?
a. make them smaller 50
b. have more of them 80
c. address problems (more presenters) 64
d. allow for more questions 40
e. not conduct them 6
f. other 45
The total number of responses was more than 239 because some
respondents provided more than one answer. The category
labeled "other" included several stated responses. The
majority of these (37) were complaints that the workshops
were too general and needed to be more specific in
addressing the concerns and informational needs of the small
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business person. The remaining 8 responses in this category-
were as follows:
1 . Not broad enough 1
2. Have more representatives of large contractors 4
3. Limit to just small businesses 2
4. Show actual bid process 1
The leading response, that more workshops should be held,
indicates that the businessmen attending considered they
would be beneficial to the business community at large. The
other positive responses indicated that the size of the
workshops should be limited in order to increase the inter-
action between the businessmen and the presenters. There
also was a significant expression of interest in having
additional presenters who were practitioners rather than
managers to provide assistance in the actual mechanics of
the contracting process.
C. CORRELATIONS
The researcher felt that correlations between some of
the questions would provide further insight into the
research area. The following correlations are intended to
enhance the information discussed previously in the chapter.
The researcher was interested in the relationship
between responses to question number eight:
Prior to your attendance at the workshop, did you feel that
you knew how to sell to the Government
103
and question number nine:
Had you bid on a government contract prior to attending
the workshop? If yes, did you receive the award of the
contract?
The breakdown is as follows:
1. Answered yes to question number eight - 109
a. bid on contract
b. awarded contract








2. Answered no to question number eight - 130
a. bid on contract
b. awarded contract
c. not awarded contract





The researcher noted that several of the respondents had
stated in question number eight that they did not know how
to sell to the Government. However, they answered
positively to both parts of the next question. This seemed
incongruent to the researcher and where the respondent had
provided his name and phone number he was called. Each was
asked why, if he did not know how to sell to the Government,
he felt he had been successful in obtaining the contract.
The answers from the respondents fell into one of two
categories. The first reason given was that they simply had
responded to a solicitation from the Government (military)
and had placed the lowest bid on the requirement. They did
not feel that they knew what they were doing only that they
had been lucky. The second reason given was that they were
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the subcontractor on a Government contract and knew how to
do business with the prime but not the Government. As can
be seen from the above, the people answering "yes" to question
number eight had been more prone to bid on Government work.
Over 90% of these had submitted bids versus only 40% of the
respondents who had answered "no" to the question. Addition-
ally, those answering "yes" to question eight had a greater
success rate than the ones answering "no". The percentage
for these was 76% versus 54%. This indicates that those who
view themselves as knowing how to bid are more likely to bid
and more likely to be successful.
The researcher then sought to segregate the above data
between large and small businesses. Was there a correlation
between the size of the business and whether or not they bid
on a contract and receive the award? The breakdown was as
follows
:
1. Answered yes to question eight - 109
a. small/bid 74
b. sraall/bid/awarded 56





f. large/did not bid 4
2, Answered no to question eight - 130
a. small/bid 45
b. small/bid/awarded 25
c. small/did not bid 69
d large/bid 8
e. large/bid/awarded 4
f. large/did not bid 4
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The researcher could find no correlation between the size of
the business and the percentages of those who bid on a
contract or received the award. The percentages for both
the yes and no answers were similar.
The final question that the researcher had concerning
question number eight had to do with its relationship to
question number eighteen. This question asked the respon-
dents if they felt they could now sell to the Government
after attending the workshop. The researcher was curious as
to how many respondents had switched their answers from
"yes" to "no" and vice versa. The breakdown was as follows:
1. Notoeight/yestoeighteen 88
2. No to eight/no to eighteen 42
3. Yes to eight/yes to eighteen 96
4. Yes to eight/no to eighteen 13
There was a significant increase in the number of respon-
dents who felt they could do business with the Government
after having attended the workshop. It was found in the
first correlation discussed above that those who thought
they knew how to sell to the Government were more inclined
to bid and were more successful when they did bid. It can
therefore be assumed that if the workshops have the affect
of altering the businessman's perception of his ability to
do business with the Government in a positive way, increased
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participation will follow. This will in turn have a posi-
tive impact on the defense industrial base and the increase
the number of contractors willing to compete for Government
contracts
.
Question fourteen was further analyzed by subdividing
the responses between small and large companies and between
manufacturing and service companies.
14. If you have not done business with the




















The distribution of responses for this question appears to
be fairly uniform. There may be some significance in the
large service business in that all of them indicated they
would attempt to do business with the Government. However,
the sample size is small and yields little confidence.
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The same division was made for question fifteen.
15. If you are doing business with the
Government, do you intend to quit?











An interesting point is disclosed by this division of the
data. Of contractors who are currently doing Government
contracting, contractors in the manufacturing category are
more heavily represented than in the sample population. It
appears that the manufacturing companies may have greater
ease of entry to the Government market. This could be
explained by a preference for domestic manufacture in a
constricting manufacturing base.
D. SUMMARY
The data portrayed in this chapter were not gathered
from a statistically random sample. They are, however,
useful in determining the attitudes and opinions of the
attendees. The workshops were viewed as being beneficial.
The workshops were instrumental in providing key information
to alter the perceptions of businessmen with regard to their
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ability to contract with the Government. The workshops have
had a positive impact on the defense industrial base and
have generated additional competition.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS. RESEARCH QUESTIONS,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
A. CONCLUSIONS
The defense industrial base in America appears to have
shrunk to the point where the U.S. is in danger of not
being able to fight a prolonged war . This is the view
expressed in the literature which was reviewed. The economy
of the U.S., though remaining strong, has become a service
oriented economy, vice a manufacturing economy. The problem
may even be worse than it appears, as many of the companies
in the U.S. that are classified as manufacturing concerns do
nothing more than process the orders for the material and
arrange for its shipment from offshore manufacturing activi-
ties ,
It appears that the Navy is lagging behind the other
Services in its ability to perform the industrial base
planning required by POD and necessary to ensure a war
fighting capability . This conclusion is based on GAO
reports which state that the Army and Air Force are either
performing the planning internally or have a data base to
enable them to do so. The Navy, though, according to both
GAO and personnel from within the Department of the Navy,
does not presently possess this ability.
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Competition is a major cost-reducing tool used by the
Navy and has been effective . The Navy, once having had a
mindset predisposed toward sole source procurement, is now
committed to competing as many of its total procurement
actions as reasonably possible. This has resulted in cost
reductions on several of its major systems procurements.
This has done two things: (1) reduced the cost of the
planned system, and (2) allowed for reprogramming of funds
saved to purchase unfunded requirements.
The procurement workshops appear to have been well
received by the business people who attended . This
conclusion is based on the answers received from business
people who returned the questionnaires. Forty-eight percent
of the respondents felt the workshops had done a good job in
providing information needed to understand the process of
contracting with the Government, whereas less than ten
percent felt the workshops did a poor job of providing this
information
.
The workshops have been effective in strengthening the
DIB and increasing competition. Of those respondents who
had never done business with the Government, the number who
said they were going to try to do so was much larger than
the number who said they would not. Additionally, the
number of those who felt they could sell to the Government
after attending the workshop increased significantly
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over the number who thought they knew how to sell prior to
attending .
The respondents felt that the procurement workshops
could be improved
. The business people who answered the
questionnaire felt that, even though the workshops were good
and had been effective in helping them understand the acqui-
sition process, they could be improved. The majority felt
they should be smaller in size (fewer attendees) and address
the problems that might be faced by a business person in
more detail .
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What have been the results of the procurement workshops
and what did the attendees think about their usefulness to
them in helping them to obtain Government contracts ? From
the questionnaires which were returned, the researcher
concludes that the workshops have been well received by the
attendees and have been useful to them in obtaining
contracts. Prior to their attendance a slight majority
(54%) felt they did not know how to sell to the Government.
After attending the workshop seventy-seven percent felt they
could be successful in selling to the Government,
Additionally, forty-two percent of the respondents who
stated they had received a contract felt their attendance at
the workshops was instrumental in their receiving the award.
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What was the effect of the procurement workshops in
increasing the number of small businesses that contract to
provide for Navy needs ? From the responses, the researcher
concludes it is probable that small business participation
in the Government acquisition process has increased. The
majority of the respondents were small business concerns
and, of the eighty respondents who stated they were going to
try to do business with the Government in the future, eighty
-two percent were small concerns.
What type of business sends representatives to the
workshops, manufacturing or service ? Of the two hundred
thirty-nine respondents, the majority were representatives
of service-oriented business concerns. The actual
percentages were; service - 81%, manufacturing - 19%.
Have the workshops increased the competitive base and
strengthened the defense industrial base ? The researcher
believes that, from the responses on the questionnaires, the
workshops have increased competition for the Navy and
strengthened the defense industrial base. The number of
respondents who felt they could do business after attending
the workshop was much greater than those who felt they could
not. Seventy-six percent felt they could sell to the
Government after attending the workshop. Prior to attending
the workshops only forty-five percent felt this way.
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Will the business people who had no prior experience in
Government contracting attempt to contract with the Govern-
ment after having attended a workshop ? The researcher feels
that, from the data obtained from the questionnaire, the
respondents who had no experience will now attempt to do
business with the Government. Of the business people who
indicated they had no experience in contracting with the
Government, either in a prime or subcontractor mode, sixty-
seven percent said they would attempt it in the future.
Why did the attendees come to the workshop ? The
majority of the attendees came to the workshops to obtain
information and to sell to the Navy.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the Navy continue to support the
Procurement workshops . The workshops have been extremely
well received by the business community and have served the
purpose of increasing competition and the strengthening the
defense industrial base.
It is recommended that a procedure be established to
ensure that the problems that are presented at the workshops
are properly addressed . One of the goals of the workshops
should be to foster good will in the business community.
When a businessman states a problem and does not have it
resolved at the workshop, a tasking should be initiated to
have the issue researched and a response provided in a
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timely fashion. It is not expected that the presenter
should be able to address every question that is posed,
however, the businessman ^should be provided with a timely
response
.
It is recommended that the format for the Procurement
workshops be changed to add a practitioner presenter and
limit the size to no more than 150 participants . The
participants indicated that they would like to be able to
get first hand, practical assistance from a working level
Government contracting representative. The Flag level
presenter should certainly be retained as well, as this
portrays a high level interest in the program. Respondents
who had attended large workshops (attended by more than 250
individuals) were adamant in their opinion that the work-
shops should be smaller to allow greater contact with the
presenter. This would also allow greater interaction in the
question and answer portion of the presentation. Smaller
groups would be in keeping with the intent of Admiral
Sansone, who initiated the workshops, that they be a




D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Research conducted for this report has provided the
basis for further study and action in two areas.
A survey could be conducted focusing on businesses which
had recently entered into the contracting process with the
Navy to determine if they have been asked to complete a DD
1519. The research could center on whether or not the Navy
is identifying those businesses which are entering the Gov-
ernment arena and placing them into the data base needed to
do the PBA.
Further research might be conducted to determine why the
Navy has been unable to publish its first PBA as required by
DOD. One area of concern which could be explored is the use
of the DD 1519 as an industrial planning tool. The litera-
ture reviewed suggests it is an inadequate tool for






1. How did you become aware of the Navy Procurement
Workshop?
a. Notification by the Dept. of the Navy
b. Notification by Congressman




2. A. What type of material/service does your business
produce/perform?
B. What is your primary Standard Industrial
Classification code (SIC)?
3. Please state the first 3 digits of your zip code.
4. Please indicate the approximate number of your
employees
.
5. What approximately is the annual sales figure for
your company rounded to the nearest thousand dollars?









7. Why did you attend the workshop?
a. curiosity
b. problem with current contract
c. wanted information




f . sell to Govt
.
g. other ( )
Prior to your attendance at the workshop, did you
feel that you knew how to sell to the Government?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
A. Had you bid on a Government contract prior to
attending the workshop?
As a prime contractor
As a subcontractor
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
C. Yes ( ) D. No ( )
B. If yes, did you receive the award of the
contract?
As a prime contractor
As a subcontractor
A. Yes ( )
C. Yes ( )
B. No ( )
D. No ( )
C. If no, what was the reason?
a. bid was too high
b. didn't understand process
c. found to be not responsive by
contracting officer






10. Did you have a Government contract that you
were currently working on when you attended the
workshop?
As a prime contractor
As a subcontractor
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
C. Yes ( ) D. No ( )
If yes , were
contract?
you having difficulty with the
As a prime contractor
As a subcontractor
A. Yes ( )
C. Yes ( )
B. No ( )








c. late payment or nonpayment
d. audit procedures
e. other
If you had a contract and were having a problem,
did you receive information from the workshop on
how to resolve it?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
If no, what was the reason?
a. too many people, couldn't ask for help
b. asked question, got run around
c. didn't understand answer




If yes, were you able to resolve the problem?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
If no, what was the reason?
a. guidance was faulty
b. did not understand guidance
c. asked question incorrectly
d. Navy did not have answer
e. problem had no solution
f. other
If, after attending the workshop, you bid on a
Government contract, either in a prime or
subcontract capacity, and were successful, do you
feel that your attendance at the procurement
workshop was instrumental in your receiving the
award?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
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13. If no, please state briefly why you feel that the
workshop did not help in your obtaining an award.
14. A. If you have not done business with the
Government do you intend to in the future?
15
B
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )




d. instability of govt business
e. Govt bidding methods
f. low profitability
g. other
If you are doing business with the Government,
do you intend to quit?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )




late payments or nonpayment
burdensome paperwork
delays in making
had problems with current
contract, tried to get help at
the workshop and didn't
more attractive commercial
ventures
unfair application of regulations ( )




16. How would you rate the workshop in respect to the
amount of information and understanding that you
received by attending?
good ( ) average ( ) poor ( )
17, Did you receive information at the workshop that you
previously had not known about?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
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18. After attending the workshop did you feel that you
could now sell to the Government?
A. Yes ( ) B. No ( )
19. If after attending the workshop you were successful
in obtaining a contract with DOD or other Government
agency, did the number of employees that you have:
increase ( ) , Amount
decrease ( ) , Amount
stay same ( )







21. If you were conducting the workshop how would you
improve it?
a. make them smaller (fewer attendees)
b. have more of them
c. address problems (more presenters)
d. allow for more questions
e. not conduct them
f. other
22. I am willing to discuss my views by phone.
A . yes ( ) B . no ( )
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46. Competition Advocate General "Year End Competition
Communique for Navy and Marine Corps Competition
Advocates and Heads of Navy Procuring Activities,"
Washington, D. C, October 1986.
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47. Personal interview with LCDR Bob Law, Contracts
Specialist, Office of Legislative Affairs, Washington,
D. C. , August 11 , 1986.
48. Telephone interview with LCDR Bob Law, Contracts
Specialist, Office of Legislative Affairs, Washington,
D. C, October 20, 1986.
49. Personal interview with Rear Admiral J. Sansone
USN(Ret), Washington, D. C, August 12, 1986.





51. Department of Defense, Small and Disadvantaged
Business Utilization Specialists , Washington, D. C.,
undated
.
52. Department of Defense, Small Business Subcontracting
Directory
,
Washington, D. C., undated.
53. Department of Defense, Guide to the Defense
Contracting Regulations for Small Business, Small
Disadvantaged Business, Women Owned Business
,




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. Defense Logistics Studies Exchange 1
U. S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801
4. LCDR R. W. Smith, Code 54Sx 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
5. Dr. David V. Lamm, Code 54Lt 5
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000




7. LCDR Robert Law 1
Navy Liaison
Rayburn House Office Bldg
Room B-324
Washington, D.C., 20155
8. Major W. H. Gaffney 1
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